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Drones: The Moral Ups and Downs 
 
Drones, UCAVs, UAVs, RPAS – whatever the label, what they have in common is 
the extreme reaction that they provoke in many people. Advocates of the technology 
are enthusiastic about the opportunities and the capabilities that present themselves to 
both policy-makers and practitioners, while critics see a dangerous slippery slope 
heading towards some kind of technologically-inspired hell, with wars being fought 
by killer robots and little or no moral accountability for the deaths of the innocent. 
The debates can be extremely polarised and, as with most complex situations, there is 
often a good deal of confusion as to what exactly is being argued about.1 This makes 
reaching a considered view rather difficult. This article will present a brief, hopefully 
balanced, account of some of the more profound ethical implications of recent 
developments in drone technology.2 It is perhaps useful to divide up the huge number 
of potential issues and explore them under discrete headings. 
 
Autonomous Killing 
 
One of the biggest fears people have about new military technology is the idea of 
“killer robots”. Cold, calculating, emotionless machines sent out, Terminator-like, to 
eliminate any and all identified threats. It is hardly surprising that the MoD have 
chosen to re-brand their Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and replace them with the 
much less threatening Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) title. The new term 
emphasises the person in control of the system rather than the idea that he or she is 
missing completely from the platform. However, in that sense, the new name is a lot 
more accurate because there is a person in charge. While drone technology is 
sophisticated enough to permit a wide range of automated functions, from taking off 
and landing though to remaining loitering over a particular geographic area for many 
hours at a time, there is still a person supervising what it is doing and it certainly does 
not make life and death decisions on its own. According to psychologist and 
technologist Professor Noel Sharkey, this is a very good thing indeed as it is clear that 
even with all the developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) over the past 20 years, 
there is still no system that is even close to being able to discriminate between a 
combatant and a non combatant in a combat zone.3 As a consequence of the current 
technological situation, the current UK position is very clear: ‘A fully autonomous 
system would have to be capable of making the qualitative assessments currently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For example, while some people are very critical of drones, it quickly becomes obvious that what 
they actually object to is drones being used to carry out ‘targeted killings’. The contentious policy of 
‘targeted killing’ is unfortunately beyond the scope of this chapter. Although it is at present heavily 
associated with drones, there is no logical reason that it cannot be accomplished using less remote 
tools. For an exploration of some of the moral issues specifically relating to this, see See D Whetham, 
‘Drones and Targeted Killing: Angels or Assassins?’, in BJ Strawser (Ed), Killing by Remote Control: 
The Ethics of an Unmanned Military (Oxford: OUP 2013). See also Michael Gross, Moral Dilemmas 
of Modern War: Torture, Assassination and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), particularly Ch. 5. 
2 The text presented here is an adapted and updated version of D Whetham, ‘Remote Killing and Drive-
By Wars’, in D Lovell & I Primoratz (Eds), Protecting Civilians During Armed Conflict: Theoretical 
and Practical Issues During Violent Conflict (Ashgate, May 2012). 
3 Noel Sharkey, ‘The Life Scientific’, BBC Radio 4, 29 January 2013. 
required by the Law of Armed Conflict, until this is possible, the human must remain 
within the decision-making process.’4 
However, it is worth noting Sharkey’s concern that the research into AI 
systems in terms of target selection etc. is being enthusiastically pursued in many 
places even if the systems are not currently being equipped with actual weaponry. If, 
or more likely when, the military situation changes at some point in the future, 
politicians who have been seduced by the promises of casualty-less conflicts will give 
the order to arm such systems and unless there are global initiatives akin to the anti-
personnel landmine ban, we will see killer robots choosing their own targets in the not 
too distant future.5 This will indeed raise some profound ethical challenges, not least 
over the question of responsibility. 
 
Killing at a Distance 
 
There are many ways to separate the ‘shooter’ from the ‘effect’. Of course, ‘standoff’ 
weapons themselves are nothing new. There is a spectrum of standoff: a rock thrown 
a few meters might be at one end, while a Tomahawk Cruise Missile might be at the 
other. A soldier with a sniper rifle, able to watch a target through a scope from a 
distance of several kilometres before pulling the trigger, is also clearly on the standoff 
spectrum, as is a fast jet pilot delivering close air support for those on the ground. 
Clearly, the drone’s degree of remoteness is much greater when considering that the 
operator routinely sits many thousands of miles away from where the drone is actually 
flying its mission, but is there really any moral difference between the soldier looking 
down the rifle scope, the drone operator looking at a screen, or the weapons engineer 
turning the launch key? One of the obvious differences is that however safe the sniper 
is, or however far removed the missile platform is from the front line, they are still in, 
over or at least near the theatre of operations, sharing certain risks, risks that the 
drone operator is simply not concerned with. But why does this matter? If their actual 
actions are going to be the same whether they are flying a plane or piloting a drone, 
surely it would be perverse to insist on using a manned platform to achieve exactly 
the same outcome. Why would you put your own personnel at risk in this way and 
claim this was somehow ethically preferable to not putting them at risk? BJ Strawser 
suggests there might actually be a moral imperative at work here that compels the 
West to pursue and deploy this type of technological development in greater numbers. 
We should not order someone to take unnecessary risks when there are alternative 
methods available that can achieve the same results but are less risky for those taking 
part.6 There does appear to be a clear common sense requirement to reduce risks to 
one’s own personnel where it is possible to do so. As a program manager at 
Honeywell puts it: ‘every time a T-Hawk goes down it means a human didn’t.’7 That 
is surely a good thing, isn’t it? As long as you can achieve the same effect without 
putting people in harm’s way, it is ‘wrong to command someone to take on 
unnecessary potentially lethal risks in an effort to carry out a just action for some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Wing Commander Alison Mardell, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – The Legal Perspective’, Air Power 
UAVs: The Wider Context (Northolt, UK: Ministry of Defence, 2009), p.82. 
5 Sharkey, ‘The Life Scientific.’ For discussions on some of the ethical implications of fully 
autonomous weapon systems, see ‘Special Issue: Ethics and Emerging Military Technologies’, Journal 
of Military Ethics, 9/4 (2010). 
6 B.J. Strawser, ‘Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles’, Journal of 
Military Ethics, 9/4 (2010), pp.342–68. 
7 Andrew Simms, ‘A Magnificent Man and His Flying Machines’, Soldier Magazine (October 2010), 
p.37. 
good’.8 On the face of it, this appears to be a strong argument in favour of using more 
drones rather than less. 
 
Accountability 
 
By highlighting the potentially huge distances between what is happening on the 
ground and the person directing it, it is easy to raise the question of accountability of 
those people for their actions. The person who has been targeted by a drone will 
probably remain completely unaware of the weapon system, let alone the operator, 
until their world, quite literally, comes crashing down, while the marine squad on the 
ground has no idea who is controlling the faceless drone in the skies above them when 
they call in fire support. What happens if something goes wrong? It is not as if one 
can just jot down a name from an ID badge. While it is, of course, always a question 
of how the technology is employed in practice, the very nature of this technology 
actually offers a much higher degree of oversight than in virtually any other area of 
military activity. Many of this author’s conversations with military personnel recently 
returned from operations in Afghanistan highlight the complete lack of effective 
scrutiny in theatre; no journalists are foolhardy enough to be embedded on long-range 
patrols so there is no media presence and such teams can be out of contact with their 
own people for extended periods. It is easy to see how what happens in the desert 
might well stay in the desert as a result.9 However, nothing could be further from this 
for the drone operator - every movement of the joystick, every frame of camera 
footage and therefore every decision (or indeed hesitation or omission) of the operator 
is recorded and can be poured over at great length following any incident. There is 
nowhere to hide from a bad decision if the military wishes to use that information 
(and recent experience suggests that if they do not, Wikileaks will ensure that action 
is taken eventually).  
That on its own would appear to offer a profound restraint on any trigger-happy 
behaviour; however, it goes further than this. While recognising that the study was 
done in very particular circumstances in Iraq and that a great deal of work has been 
done to correct these attitudes since, the 2006 Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) 
IV research showed that 45 per cent of US soldiers and 60 per cent of marines 
surveyed stated that they would not report a fellow unit member for killing an 
innocent non-combatant. These figures rise to 57 and 70 per cent respectively for not 
reporting a fellow unit member for unnecessarily destroying private property.10 
Adequate oversight – fear of being caught – is one of the ways that such attitudes and 
behaviour can be adapted and changed.11 While the thought of drones being used to 
spy on friendly forces as well as hostile ones is not necessarily palatable to everyone, 
the fact that the whereabouts of such assets is generally unknown but that when 
present they are perfectly capable of seeing events on the ground in intimate detail 
means that there is at least a chance of having misdemeanours captured on film. 
Knowing or even thinking that there is a small chance of someone watching might 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Strawser, ‘Moral Predators’, p.344. 
9 For a disturbing account of what can happen when effective oversight is lacking, see Mark Boal, ‘The 
Kill Team’, Rolling Stone, 27 March 2011, <http://www.rollingstone.com/kill-team>  
10 Mental Health Advisory Team IV, Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07: Final Report, 17 November 
2006, p.37, 
<http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/reports/mhat/mhat_iv/MHAT_IV_Report_17NOV06.pdf>  
11 See Paolo Tripodi, ‘Understanding Atrocities’ (pp.173–88), and the chapter by Peter Wall (pp.221–
9) in Whetham, in David Whetham (ed.), Ethics, Law and Military Operations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2010). 
help improve questions of accountability far beyond just the operator of the drone 
itself. 
 
Precision (and its Paradox) 
 
While it is obvious, it is still necessary to add the caveat that just because something 
is capable of being used in a particular way that does not mean that it actually will be. 
In that sense drones are exactly the same as any other military technological 
development throughout history: anything is potentially open to abuse or can be put to 
use in pursuit of illegitimate ends. However, in terms of precision, many of the 
advantages of the latest drone technology, when used appropriately, appear obvious. 
Rather than having to saturate a target with multiple sorties in order to have 
confidence in its destruction, the same military outcome can be achieved with fewer 
and smaller weapons due to their improved accuracy. The resulting reduction in 
foreseeable but unintended and unwanted civilian death and destruction – collateral 
damage – is therefore significant.12 By using drones, no pilots need to put their lives 
at risk at all, as the platform can be controlled far from the theatre of operations. 
‘Such weapons can therefore help to preserve life from both perspectives (and are 
more financially efficient into the bargain).’13 
Of course, sometimes things do go wrong. Any system is only as good as the 
information that goes into it. Accidents and mistakes do happen – from accidentally 
destroying the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 through to bombing wedding 
parties, such as in Wech Baghtu, Afghanistan, in 2008.14 One report that looked at the 
use of UAVs in Pakistan’s remote tribal areas concluded that ‘32 per cent of those 
killed in drone attacks since 2004 were civilians’.15 While civilian deaths caused by 
such accidents are obviously highly regrettable, the fact that they took place at all 
leads some to the idea that they must have been intended in the first place. The 
argument is that if the weapons are as accurate as we make out, surely, whatever those 
weapons hit must be the intended target – the paradox of precision.16 The importance 
of managing expectations and not creating an erroneous mythology surrounding the 
West’s ability to carry out attacks with pinpoint accuracy is essential, as is an 
understanding by policy makers that just because the technology has the potential to 
be extremely accurate that does not mean that there will not be civilian casualties. 
Despite what propaganda might claim, warfare has never been clinical in this sense 
and is unlikely to suddenly become so as long as the fog of war and friction – all of 
the factors out of one’s control that stop things working in the way one intends – 
persist. The situation is exacerbated when an opponent deliberately seeks to ‘draw the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Singer notes that in World War II, it took an average of 108 planes to successfully prosecute each 
target. In Afghanistan 60 years later, each aircraft could be expected to successfully engage more than 
four different targets per sortie. See P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict 
in the 21st Century (New York: Penguin, 2010), p.100. 
13 David Whetham, ‘Ethics, Law and Conflict’, in David Whetham (ed.), Ethics, Law and Military 
Operations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), p.20. 
14 ‘Embassy Strike “A Mistake”’, BBC News, 8 May 1999, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/338557.stm>; ‘Karzai Says Air Strike Kills 40 in 
Afghanistan’, Reuters, 5 November 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/11/05/us-afghan-
violence-idUSTRE4A44EW20081105>  
15 ‘One in Three Killed by US Drones in Pakistan is a Civilian, Report Claims’, The Telegraph, 4 
March 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7361630/One-in-three-killed-
by-US-drones-in-Pakistan-is-a-civilian-report-claims.html>  
16 Whetham, ‘Ethics, Law and Conflict’, p.21. 
foul’, as it is known in basketball: placing themselves in a situation from which to do 
harm when they know that any military response will either violate, or be perceived as 
violating, the rules of in bello by creating substantial numbers of civilian casualties.17 
The decision to abort an attack with Storm Shadow missiles on a mission over Libya 
in 2011 rather than risk killing civilians allegedly being used as ‘human shields’ 
illustrates this dilemma only too well.18 Of course, as with so many other issues, this 
is not a problem unique to drones, but rather an issue for all military activity in the 
contemporary operating environment. 
 
Moral Disconnection 
 
There is an innate reluctance in many, if not most, people to kill. This inhibition – 
necessary for civilised society to function – has to be overcome by military training to 
allow individuals to achieve emotional distance from their enemies and thus enable 
the individual to kill.19 One of the tools traditionally employed to get people to kill 
each other is dehumanization – the promotion of a sense of ‘otherness’ in the group 
that is deemed to be a threat. Those who fall into such a group can then be perceived 
as ‘non-entities, expendable or undeserving,’ making the act of killing them easier to 
carry out.20 After Prince Harry compared his job as a co-pilot gunner in an Apache 
gunship to a game on a video console,21 it is easy to see how some people would 
wonder about the moral effect of killing when they are just pixels on a screen and 
there is no need to look anyone ‘in the eye’. How much easier, then, must this be if 
the person ‘pulling the trigger’ is 8,000 km away to begin with? Does this make the 
act of killing using standoff weapons or drones easier as far as one’s conscience is 
concerned? Grayling notes that Royal Air Force (RAF) bomber crews in World War 
II could unleash their bombs from 20,000ft and knowingly kill hundreds or even 
thousands of women and children. If, however, you gave the same bomber crew a 
knife and told them to slit the throats of the family in the room next door, they would 
not be able to do it.22 Physical separation appears to also provide some moral distance 
in order to make such actions easier to carry out, even to the extent of making terrible 
things possible. Interviews with contemporary military pilots with combat experience 
show that they tend to agree that ‘not only are decisions to kill [from the air] rarely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Michael Skerker, ‘Just War Criteria and the New Face of War: Human Shields, Manufactured 
Martyrs, and Little Boys with Stones’, Journal of Military Ethics, 3/1 (2004): 28. That lessons are 
being learnt might be indicated by the apparent reduction in civilian deaths associated with drones. For 
example, see Ken Dilanian, ‘CIA Drones May Be Avoiding Pakistan Civilians’, The Sacramento Bee, 
7 March 2011, <http://www.sacbee.com/2011/02/21/3419750/cia-drones-may-be-avoiding-
pakistan.html>  
18 Ian Dury, ‘Mission Aborted on Orders of SAS’, HMForces.co.uk, 22 March 2011, 
<http://www.hmforces.co.uk/news/articles/6375-mission-aborted-on-orders-of-sas>  
19 See Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1996). 
20 Susan Opotow, ‘Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction’, Journal of Social Issues, 46/1 
(Spring 1990). See also Edward Tick, War and the Soul: Healing Our Nation’s Veterans from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (Wheaton, Ill.: Quest Books, 2005), pp.82 ff. 
21 Jon Boone, ‘Taliban retaliate after Prince Harry compares fighting to a video game’, The Guardian 
22 January 2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jan/22/afghanistan-taliban-response-prince-
harry> 
22 For a fascinating and balanced discussion of these issues, see A.C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2006). 
perceived as emotionally charged, the death of friendly, yet physically distant 
combatants is emotionally dulled’.23 
It would appear that the process of alienation of each side from the other due to 
reliance upon remote killing might be enhanced by the lack of actual contact. Whether 
this is a roadside improvised explosive device (IED) for which people bid money over 
the Internet to win the right to detonate the bomb and watch the results on a web-link 
or a drone operator wasting tiny avatars on a computer screen, it is difficult to see 
how you can have the essential mutual respect that combatant equality – the bedrock 
of the law of armed conflict – requires. If a faceless enemy can be so demonised, it is 
easy to see how lines can become blurred and civilians can come to be seen as just 
another target. 
Not everyone who is physically distant, however, can emotionally separate 
themselves from their actions or other events on the ground. An American World War 
II veteran recalled his first mission over Europe as he opened his aircraft’s bomb-bay 
doors: ‘He felt terrible resistance, nausea, sickness, headaches, despair. He couldn’t 
do it, but his crew chief screamed at him, “Now! Now!” If he didn’t, the mission 
would be a failure and it would be his fault. He finally pushed the button. Then he 
vomited.’24 Of course, this refers to an act that was part of a total war in which large-
scale, devastating attacks on civilian populations were common rather than the type of 
highly accurate, precision-targeting policies of wars of choice in the cotemporary age. 
Still, the moral comfort that distance can provide might not extend as far as many 
would think. Just because the target is being viewed through a TV screen rather than a 
rifle sight that does not mean that taking life has no affect on the person pulling the 
trigger. Perhaps surprisingly, there are examples of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) among drone pilots who have never even set foot in the theatre of military 
operations.25 
One wonders if operating a drone for offensive missions in the contemporary 
operating environment might actually be closer to the experience of military snipers.26 
Snipers, too, are separated by distance, but can also be intimately aware of their 
target, much like the drone operator with their real-time video feeds who might be 
tracking a target for hours before the decision is taken to strike. A sniper deployed in 
Iraq recalls: 
Theoretically, sniping was supposed to be a matter of clinical, dispassionate killing. ‘Even 
when we were in Iraq, killing Iraqis, it was target one, target two. Target one’s on the left; 
target two’s on the right. OK, scan target one. Target one’s down. Scan target two. Fire. 
Target two’s down. That’s it. They’re just targets; you try to convince yourself of that.’ 
[However] imagining a man purely as a target was not easy when you had to aim specifically 
at him and fire and then watch him fall over, screaming and arching his back in agony.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Tucker-Lowe, Does the Advent of Uninhabited Systems Fundamentally Affect the Ethical Landscape 
of Contemporary Conflict?, Defence Research Paper (Unpublished Defence Studies MA Dissertation, 
King’s College, London, July 2010), p.11. 
24 Tick, p.91. 
25 For example, see Jane Mayer, ‘The Risks of a Remote-Controlled War’, National Public Radio, 21 
October 2009. This is also discussed in Singer, Wired for War. 
26 Dave Cummins, an RAF Reaper operator based at Creech Airforce Base near Las Vegas made 
precisely this observation on ‘World at One’, BBC Radio 4, 4 January 2013. 
27 Jeff Sparrow, Killing: Misadventures in Violence (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2009). 
Drone footage can be just as graphic and one wonders whether the geographic 
dislocation is actually providing moral dislocation at all, or at least any dislocation 
greater than that experienced by a sniper.28 An RAF RPAS operator noted that: 
a day, two days, maybe a month can be spent watching and then when it happens, we don’t 
leave once we’ve dropped the weapons, we stick around for battle damage assessment and 
because of the way of the Muslim faith - they like to bury their dead before the sun goes down - 
generally you will see the funeral procession, the women and children arrive, it can be very 
emotional and that’s one of the things they’re looking for to make sure that that doesn’t turn into 
a problem in ten, fifteen years.29 
On the other hand, even if it is not clear that the geographic disconnection actually 
makes killing (or at least dealing psychologically with the results of killing) any 
easier, it has to be the case that the absence from the physical situation has some clear 
implications for the effectiveness of the drone operator. Because the operator is not 
directly at risk, they have a number of options that a person physically in harm’s way 
can probably not afford. Another drone operator refers to this as the ability to ‘step 
back and have a bit more of a Hamlet moment as it were…you can hopefully double-
check what you’re doing is correct’.30 This detachment provides time and space for 
decision making that is, quite literally, a world away from that experienced by those 
soldiers on the ground or even pilots in hostile airspace. The ability to remain cool, 
calm and detached arguably allows better decisions to be taken in the heat of battle. 
There are undoubtedly situational awareness issues linked to available 
bandwidth, potential time delays and the physical limitations of the information feeds, 
but these are all technical issues that are constantly being minimized or ameliorated. 
At the same time, one might expect that the quality of the decisions being made 
should be getting better and better. For example, the Mental Health Advisory Team 
report cited above makes a strong correlation between anger and the mistreatment of 
non-combatants. It also suggests that soldiers and marines who were members of units 
that had suffered casualties were more likely to treat civilians in negative ways.31 If 
there is some emotional distance between the drone operator and the events on the 
ground, presumably, such factors will have less influence on behaviour. ‘Once fear 
for their own safety is not a pressing concern, one would assume the operator would 
be more capable, not less, of behaving justly.’32 Tripodi argues that the ability to 
remain slightly detached from one’s immediate situation is one of the attributes of a 
good commander.33 If so, the enforced detachment of the drone operator might well 
be a positive thing. 
Grossman, in his powerful book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of 
Learning to Kill in War and Society, notes that it is those who do not dehumanize 
their opponents who are most likely to be able to deal with the aftermath of war and 
go on to lead happy and productive lives. If it is true that the innate (or at least the 
socially programmed) inhibitions do not need to be overcome in the same way for 
drone operators as they do for, say, infantry who need to be prepared to close with 
and then kill the enemy, the psychological repercussions of war might be significantly 
reduced. It will be interesting to see if incidences of PTSD among drone operators in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 This emphasizes the idea introduced above that, in many ways, remote killing is in reality a spectrum 
rather than sharp differentiation. There is a connection between the Lancaster bomber crews in World 
War II and the English and Welsh archers at Agincourt in 1415. 
29 Cummins, ‘World at One’. 
30 Individual referred to only as Fire Control Officer, ‘World at One’. 
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the longer term turn out to be significantly different to those who are physically 
present in the battle space.  
The distance between the drone and the operator can also raise the question of 
whether the operator needs to be a combatant at all or whether civilians can undertake 
such roles. Whilst it is not necessarily unlawful for a civilian to take direct part in 
hostilities, they do lose their immunity from attack while doing so. That means they 
may be directly targeted and, if captured, they will not be recognized as combatants or 
receive the protection of prisoner-of-war status.34 Of course, if the civilian operator is 
in a different country to the actual military operation, this might seem to be a small or 
acceptable risk to take but it needs also to be remembered that civilians employing 
lethal force that is not in direct self-defence may be charged with murder. ‘Therefore, 
allowing civilians to operate drones during armed conflict may have significant 
implications for them if their activity amounts to a direct part in hostilities.’35 
Does the removal of physical risk mean that drone operators are not really at 
war at all? Are even those in uniform actually fellow combatants? Apart from these 
existential questions, this also raises some interesting dilemmas over the nature of 
direct and indirect participation in conflict that the geographic separation from the 
battlefield might appear to cloud a little. If a man drives his brother to plant an IED, 
he might be a civilian, but he is facilitating the planting of the device and can 
therefore be considered to be directly participating in hostilities at that time. As such, 
he may be legitimately targeted while carrying out this role. Compare this with a 
husband on the morning school run dropping his officer wife at work at an airforce 
base in Nevada where she will be piloting a drone employed in offensive operations. 
Doesn’t he, too, become a direct participant in hostilities while acting as chauffeur? 
This has implications for the way we need to think about the contemporary operating 
environment and the changing moral landscape it generates. Some of these challenges 
were acknowledged by the same RPAS operator cited above who noted that his hour-
long commute was important for adjusting from home life to combat mentality: 
it gives you time to adjust - you do have to be in the right frame of mind to do this. You are 
carrying munitions and weapons that can end lives so its not the kind of thing where you can 
enter the box worried about the next mortgage payment or worried about how the kids are going 
to get to school tomorrow.36 
 
Asymmetric Implications 
 
Another area of military activity in which drones might create a particular ethical 
challenges is with the potential mismatch between opponents. The asymmetrical 
threat concept normally focuses attention on those hostile agents who seek to turn the 
tables on the sophisticated military machines they oppose by not playing the same 
game. This can range from adopting hit-and-run-style guerrilla attacks that prevent 
the preponderance of military power being brought to bear through to using IEDs 
against dismounted troops or their vehicles. It is important to recognize, however, that 
there is another side to this asymmetrical reality: using remotely piloted drones 
against those who cannot counter them is just as asymmetrical as using IEDs. This 
does not seem to me to be particularly controversial, rather it is just recognizing that 
one normally seeks to exploit an opponent’s weakness rather than attacking their 
strength. Conducting a war from thousands of metres in the air without even being in 	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the same hemisphere as the weapon might be seen, however, to be taking such an 
asymmetry to the extreme. Any military activity carried out by a technologically 
sophisticated protagonist against a less sophisticated one is inherently asymmetrical. 
Singer notes Arthur C. Clarke’s observation that ‘[a]ny sufficiently advanced 
technology is indistinguishable from magic’.37 Is it even ethical to use such magic on 
those who cannot employ it themselves? Münkler suggests: ‘The pilot of a fighter-
bomber or the crew of a man-of-war from which Tomahawk rockets are launched are 
beyond the reach of the enemy’s weapons. War has lost all features of the classical 
duel situation here and has approached, to put it cynically, certain forms of pest 
control.’38 This feeling – evocatively captured here – is a common concern when 
determining the proportionality of one’s response within the criteria provided by the 
in bello category of the Just War Tradition. War can become ‘like playing God from 
afar, just with unmanned weapons substituted for thunderbolts’.39 Disturbing though 
these images might be, the question is, however, fundamentally misguided if it is 
motivated by a concern to create a level playing field: ‘the principle of proportionality 
is not about being fair, it is about not using more force than is necessary to achieve 
the required ends.’40 It would be morally perverse to avoid any weapon that one’s 
opponent did not have access to, thereby eschewing precision munitions and causing 
additional and unnecessary death and destruction, or putting your own people in 
harm’s way unnecessarily out of some misguided notion of fair play. 
 
Conclusion: Drones and the Threshold to the Use of Military Force 
 
There is an argument that precision standoff weapons such as drones offer policy 
makers an option for direct action that would simply not be present, or at least 
realistic, using more conventional tools in the military toolbox. The ‘CNN effect’, 
refers to the expectation that public support for military action will fall away as 
civilian casualties mount and friendly forces become casualties in increasing 
numbers.41 If both of these considerations can be minimised through the use of 
precision weapons, remotely piloted from afar, the argument follows that public 
resolve can therefore be maintained – an essential consideration when democracies 
want to use military force, particularly where vital national interests are not obviously 
at stake. By lowering the potential political costs, this can, in turn, make it easier to 
intervene militarily where it might simply have been impossible to do so before. For 
example, it is unlikely that the United States would have been politically able to 
justify the killing of the Al Qaeda leader Qaed Senyan al-Harthi, thought to be 
responsible for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, using a Predator drone, if 
they had needed to actually invade Yemen with ‘boots on the ground’ to do it.42 
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This potential lowering of the political threshold appears to open up 
opportunities to use military force in situations where it would have been far harder in 
the past, but is this actually a good thing? Can one imagine President Obama 
promising to engage terrorists in Pakistan with or without the support of the Pakistan 
Government if it still required squadrons and squadrons of aircraft, suppression of 
enemy air defences and so on? ‘We’re not really violating Pakistan’s sovereignty; it’s 
only a drone.’ This attitude can lead to the promotion of wars in which there is no real 
moral commitment to the struggle. As was darkly joked in 1999 when NATO was 
willing to bomb to stop a massacre, but only as long as pilots were not put at risk by 
flying below 15,000ft, ‘the life of one NATO soldier is worth 20,000 Kosovars’.43 
‘Are we on the eve of a new age of “drive-by” wars, in which American power can 
strike anywhere, in near certainty that neither its civilians nor its soldiers will ever be 
put at risk?’44 
The reduction or even elimination of risk offered by precision standoff means 
that it is easier to resort to the use of force and this risks making what should be a tool 
of last resort a first or at least early response to any crisis. This has to be profoundly 
worrying. Strawser argues that even if this argument at first appears to be ‘intuitively 
plausible’, it ultimately fails as a valid objection because it does not negate the moral 
imperative to use drones or other standoff weapons when they are available and 
equally effective.45 I accept that at the tactical and operational level there might 
indeed be a moral imperative to reduce the risk to our own personnel where it is 
possible to do so. It is indeed ‘wrong to command someone to take on unnecessary 
potentially lethal risks in an effort to carry out a just action for some good’.46 The 
very reduction in that risk might, however, actually contribute to failure at the 
strategic level resulting in the conclusion that taking some risk might be necessary to 
achieve one’s political aims. Why should the ‘losing side’ accept their defeat? 
Perhaps there is a lesson to be drawn from the experience of the Sunni Triangle in 
Iraq: ‘the future hotbed of rebellion wasn’t occupied until weeks after Baghdad fell in 
2003, and local would-be insurgents instead got the signal that they had never been 
defeated.’47 New generations of standoff weapons seem to demonstrate ‘an ability to 
kill but little or no willingness to die for the West’s causes’. 48  Technological 
advantages might actually be sending a message of a fundamental lack of resolve to 
see an issue through to the end. It is, after all, the ‘willingness to take mortal risk 
[that] is what makes military deterrence believable’. 49  In Beirut, those on the 
receiving end of unmanned targeting and the ‘all-seeing eye in the sky’ saw the result 
as a ‘spurring of mass identity politics … as an antidote to the technology discrepancy 
… they [Israelis and American] don’t want to fight us like real men, but are afraid to 
fight. So we just have to kill a few of their soldiers to defeat them.’50 It was not the 
bombing from above a safe distance of 15,000ft that led to success in Kosovo, it was 
the eventual credible threat of substantial numbers of boots on the ground combined 
with real political pressure from the international community – a demonstration of 
both credible means and genuine resolve. We might well find ourselves getting into 	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future situations more easily because of the apparent low cost of action only to find 
that we have started something that we do not have the stomach or the tools to finish. 
The removal of our own military personnel from harm’s way wherever possible 
might also have other implications for our own civilian population who might 
themselves start to be seen as legitimate targets. It seems a small jump to go from 
targeting a family car carrying a drone operator to work, to building a justification for 
attacking other civilian targets in a country. If it is impossible to hurt a state’s military 
assets due to it relying predominantly on drones, how does one fight back against that 
state? If there are no legitimate targets for you to strike, does that mean you may 
broaden the permitted range of targets if the stakes are high enough? Does this justify 
the breaking of the normal rules due to the creation of some sort of ‘supreme 
emergency’ where an effective response within the normal rules of in bello is simply 
impossible? 
The term ‘supreme emergency’ was coined by Winston Churchill to depict the 
terrible situation that Britain found herself in early in 1941: faced with imminent 
invasion and with only RAF Bomber Command as an effective offensive weapon. 
There was little doubt regarding the terrible cost of defeat to the Nazi powers and the 
existential crisis was seen to justify using those bombers against the only target that 
could be struck given the limits of technology at the time: German cities and the 
German people.51 This supreme emergency passed as other theatres of operation 
opened up, new allies joined the struggle, technology improved allowing more 
accurate targeting and, most importantly, the threat of the imminent invasion of 
Britain passed. As the emergency passed, the deliberate bombing of German civilians 
became increasingly difficult to justify on moral grounds (although, of course, it 
continued anyway).52 The existential test for supreme emergency and the contentious 
leeway it offers is a very hard one to pass (if it can be passed at all) but it is easy to 
see how such arguments can be made to sound convincing to those who feel 
powerless in the face of overwhelming technological superiority. Once this feeling of 
impotence is combined with rhetoric that convinces a population that they are being 
‘exterminated’ by a faceless enemy that is impossible to counter, taking the war to 
that enemy’s undefended homeland and targeting the civilian population there in 
order to stop the attacks on your own homeland seem much easier to justify. 
It would be churlish not to acknowledge that drone technology offers a whole 
range of military advantages and that many of these are to be welcomed from an 
ethical perspective. However, there are a number of challenges that potentially come 
to a head if drones go from being one of many tools to being the tool of military and 
political choice. The ability to conduct standoff wars in a way that minimizes risks to 
non-combatants might well lower the political threshold to employing military force, 
making the occurrence of war more frequent. At the same time, it might make those 
conflicts more difficult to resolve due to the lack of will to put our own people in 
harm’s way when required. Getting involved more often in other people’s affairs 
while relying overwhelmingly on military tools that reduce or eliminate risk to our 
own combatants, ironically, might also increase the risk to our own civilian 
population. Some see robots as our ‘answer to the suicide bomber’,53 but what if an 
over-reliance on that remote approach to war becomes the very thing that inspires 
them? 	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